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PLACING PROFITS ABOVE HIPPOCRATES: THE
HYPOCRISY OF GENERAL SERVICE HOSPITALS
Robert Steinbuch*
I. INTRODUCTION
Specialty hospitals focus on a specific medical field--often high
dollar fields, such as orthopedics or cardiology These hospitals are
often physician owned.2 "The GAO (Government Accountability Of-
fice) classified hospitals that met these criteria into five types of spe-
cialty hospitals: cardiac, orthopedic, surgical, women's, and other."3
General service hospitals (GSHs), in contrast, are full service entities
and are generally non-profit institutions.4 For GSHs, "cases requiring
cardiac, orthopedic, or general surgical services are among their most
profitable."5 As a consequence of their desire to hold onto their most
profitable cases, GSHs-through "[tihe American Hospital Associa-
tion (ALIA) and the Federation of American Hospitals (FAH)[-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William
H. Bowen School of Law. J.D. from, and John M. Olin Law & Economics Fellow at,
Columbia Law School. B.A. and M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania. Com-
missioner on the Arkansas Commission for Newborn Umbilical Cord Blood Bank
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1. Battle Lines Drawn over Specialty Hospitals, AAMC REPORTER, May 2006,
available at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/may06/specialty.htm [hereinafter
AAMC Reporter].
2. Id.
3. John K. Iglehart, The Emergence of Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals, 352
NEW ENG. J. MED. 78, 78 (2005), available at
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/352/1/78 [hereinafter Iglehart, Hospitals].
4. Id. at 79.
The GAO also reported that more than ninety percent of the specialty
hospitals that have opened since 1990 are for-profit entities, as compared
with twenty percent of all general hospitals. Specialty hospitals are much
less likely than general hospitals to have emergency departments (forty-
five percent vs. ninety-two percent) or to treat Medicaid or uninsured pa-
tients. In 2001, specialty hospitals accounted for an estimated $871 million,
or one percent, of Medicare's spending on inpatient services, nearly two-
thirds of which went to facilities that treat patients with cardiac disorders
Id..
5. Id. at 78.
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]have begun an aggressive [political] effort to thwart the development
of more specialty hospitals" through the use of "economic credential-
ing" and loyalty oaths.6 GSHs typically critique specialty hospitals by
arguing that (1) the specialty hospitals threaten the viability of GSHs
by skimming off revenue-generating cases that finance unprofitable
basic services such as emergency room services and (2) specialty hos-
pitals create conflicts of interest when physicians refer patients to their
7own hospitals for financial reasons. This article considers these ar-
guments and concludes that the anti-competitive tactics utilized by
GSHs are against societal interests and medical regulations.
II. THE EFFORTS TO THWART THE GROWTH OF SPECIALTY
HOSPITALS
In Little Rock, Arkansas, there are several GSHs; the three most
notable are University of Arkansas for Medical Science Hospital,
Saint Vincent Health System, and Baptist Medical Center. There are
also two outstanding specialty hospitals-the Arkansas Heart Hospital
and the Arkansas Surgical Hospital.8 These specialty hospitals actively
compete on the basis that they generally provide better care than that
provided at GSHs.9
One method that GSHs have adopted to combat the encroach-
ment of specialty hospitals is the concept of "economic credentialing."
6. Id. at 83.
7. AAMC REPORTER, supra note 1. ("'The AAMC is concerned that specialty
hospitals treat disproportionately low shares of very sick and uninsured and under-
insured patients, create conflicts of interest, and negatively impact the revenue centers
of teaching hospitals,' said Richard Knapp, executive vice president of the AAMC
and head of the office of government relations."); Sujit Choudhry, Niteesh K. Choud-
hry & Troyen A. Brennan, Specialty Versus Community Hospitals: What Role For The
Law?: A paradox exists in the mixed market/regulatory posture of U.S. health care,
HEALTH AFFAIRS:THE POLICY JOURNAL OF THE HEALTH SPHERE, Aug. 9, 2005, avail-
able at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/fulllhlthaff.w5.361DC1 [hereinafter
Choudhry, Specialty Versus Community Hospitals]. "General hospitals warn that spe-
cialty hospitals threaten their financial viability and quality of care by reducing the
volume of procedures performed in full-service settings." Id.
8. I have no affiliation with these hospitals. I have served as a Board of Trustees
Member on the Society of Chest Pain Centers, which accredited both Saint Vincent's
Chest Pain Center and the Arkansas Heart Hospital. If I thought that I was having a
heart attack or if I needed orthopedic surgery, I would prefer to go to the Arkansas
Heart Hospital or the Arkansas Surgical Hospital, respectively.
9. See, e.g., AAMC REPORTER, supra note 1. (Officials at Houston's Texas Or-
thopedic Hospital said specialty hospitals can perform routine orthopedic procedures
three times faster than the average general hospital, with an infection rate of less than
one percent and high patient satisfaction.)
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Although there is no single definition for economic credentialing, ° the
American Medical Association (AMA) has defined it as "the use of
economic criteria unrelated to quality of care or professional compe-
tence in determining a physician's qualifications for initial or continu-
ing hospital medical staff membership or privileges."" The method
for credentialing doctors employed by hospitals has evolved over time.
"Historically, hospital credentialing decisions have been based almost
exclusively on qualitative criteria and a physician's clinical compe-
tence."'2  Thereafter, the concept of "economic credentialing"
evolved. "[E]conomic credentialing meant that hospitals would assess
the insurance coverage of a physician's panel of patients before grant-
ing admitting privileges, to limit privileges to physicians caring predo-
minantly for well-insured patients."' 3 Recently, economic credential-
ing has developed further, such that GSHs have denied privileges to
doctors who are owners of competing specialty hospitals or who do
not agree to refer all patients to the GSH.14
GSHs argue that in order to be able to offer essential but unpro-
fitable services, such as an emergency room, obstetrics, pediatrics, and
critical care, they need to "protect" their market in highly lucrative
practice areas, such as orthopedics and cardiology." As such, GSHs
have been known to:
refuse to grant initial or continuing staff privileges to physicians
who own or have other financial interests in competing healthcare
entities, refer patients to competing entities, have staff privileges at
any other area hospitals, or fail to admit some specified percentage
10. See James W. Marks and Jayme R. Matchinski, Conflicts Credentialing: Hos-
pitals and the Use of Financial Considerations to Make Medical Staffing Decisions, 31
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1009, 1015 (2005). See also Beverly Cohen, An Examination
of the Right of Hospitals to Engage in Economic Credentialing, 77 TEMp. L. REV. 705,
729 (2004); Judith E. Orie, Economic Credentialing: Bottom-Line Medical Care, 36
Duo. L. REV. 437, 441 (1998).
11. AMA: American Medical Association, 2003 Legal Issues: Economic Creden-
tialing-Issues and Answers (2003), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resourcesllegal-topics/current-legal-topics/2003.shtml (last visited Nov. 30, 2008). [he-
reinafter AMA, Economic Credentialing].
12. John W. Jones, Legal implications of economic credentialing, PHYSICIAN'S
NEWS DIGEST (April 2006), available at
http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/406jones.html.
13. Choudhry, Specialty Versus Community Hospitals, supra note 7.
14. See Jones, supra note 12.
15. Elizabeth A. Weeks, The New Economic Credentialing: Protecting Hospitals
from Competition by Medical Staff, 36 J. HEALTH L. 247, 248 (2003), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=959196#.
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of their patients to the hospital. Alternatively, the hospital might
require a physician seeking privileges to sign a loyalty oath or
pledge to perform a certain percentage of medical services at the
hospital.
16
Given that GSHs complain that specialty hospitals foster conflicts
of interest when physicians refer patients to their own hospitals for
financial reasons, 7 these loyalty oaths are particularly insincere as they
result in the very same outcome about which GSHs complain. The
difference, however, is that this hypocrisy inures to their benefit.
The AMA has stated its opposition to the use of economic crite-
ria unrelated to patient care to grant privileges: 8
The AMA believes that the practice of conditioning a physician's
medical staff privileges on an agreement to refer patients only to
that hospital is a violation of the anti-kickback law .... Whether
called loyalty oaths or conflict of interest policies, the effect is the
same. These practices... negatively impact a physician's preroga-
tive regarding patient care as well as patient choice.' 9
Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's2 challenged this policy of economic
credentialing in South Dakota." In that case, a hospital refused to
credential doctors because they apparently had a competing financial
interest." The doctors sued the hospital.' The South Dakota Su-
preme Court ruled that the hospital could base its decision to grant or
16. Id.
17. AAMC Reporter, supra note 1; Choudhry, Specialty Versus Community Hos-
pitals, supra note 7.
18. AMA, Economic Credentialing, supra note 11.
19. Id.
20. 621 N.W.2d 150 (S.D. 2001).
21. Id.; Choudhry, Specialty Versus Community Hospitals, supra note 7. But see
Jones, supra note 12:
In its 2005 Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals,
OIG provides: "Certain medical staff credentialing practices may implicate
the anti-kickback statute. For example, conditioning privileges on a partic-
ular number of referrals or requiring the performance of a particular num-
ber of procedures, beyond volumes necessary to ensure clinical proficien-
cy, potentially raise substantial risks under the statute. On the other hand,
a credentialing policy that categorically refuses privileges to physicians
with significant conflicts of interest would not appear to implicate the sta-
tute in most situations. Whether a particular credentialing policy runs
afoul of the anti-kickback statute would depend on the specific facts and
circumstances, including the intent of the parties."
22. Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, 621 N.W.2d 150, 153 (S.D. 2001).
23. Id.; Choudhry, Specialty Versus Community Hospitals, supra note 7.
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deny credentials for economic reasons rather than quality of care.'
"The court ... recognized that the hospital relied on 'the profitable
neurosurgical services' in order to be able to continue offering 'other
unprofitable services' in the . . . area. The court's decision seemed
informed by the unique economics of hospital financing that require
cost-spreading [to] fund[] treatment for uninsured and underinsured
patients. ' ' 5
In Little Rock, the situation of Janet Cathey, a gynecologist,
presents a conspicuous example of economic credentialing.26 For
twenty years her medical practice was centered at Baptist Medical
Center, Little Rock's largest hospital. ' Baptist is the largest health-
care system in Arkansas and is the preferred provider for Arkansas
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the state's biggest health insurer.28  In-
deed, Baptist is Blue Cross's only acute care hospital in Little Rocky.
Cathey's husband joined a group of Baptist doctors who were opening
Arkansas Surgical Hospital." In anticipation of competition from the
new Arkansas Surgical Hospital, Baptist established an economic cre-
dentialing policy.31 The policy prohibits doctors "with a direct or indi-
rect financial interest in a competing hospital" from having privileges
at Baptist's hospitals.32 Indeed, "the policy applies not only to physi-
cian investors in such facilities, but also to their immediate family
members-with no right to a hearing or appellate review.""
Cathey was informed by Baptist that under the terms of the new
conflict-of-interest policy, once Arkansas Surgical Hospital opened,
her appointment and clinical privileges at Baptist would be termi-
nated.' Thus, as a result of her husband's involvement in Arkansas
Surgical Hospital, Cathey was no longer entitled to admit patients or
perform procedures at Baptist.35 Because most of her patients were
24. Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, 621 N.W.2d 150 (S.D. 2001); Choudhry, Specialty
Versus Community Hospitals, supra note 7.
25. Weeks, supra note 15, at 251-52.
26. Berkeley Rice, Economic credentialing: When hospitals play hardball,








32. Rice, supra note 26.
33. Rice, supra note 26.
34. Rice, supra note 26.
35. Rice, supra note 26.
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insured by Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Cathey's loss of pri-
vileges at Baptist would destroy her practice and deny her patients the
choice of care they once had.6 Similarly, Baptist stripped privileges
from six cardiologists who are part-owners of Little Rock's Arkansas
Heart Hospital 7 Cathey and the cardiologists sued separately.' The
cardiologists were granted an injunction, but, on appeal, the Arkansas
Supreme Court remanded the case back to circuit court.39 On remand
the circuit court granted an injunction on behalf of the cardiologists,
which was appealed. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the in-
junction.'
Although it is distasteful, the concept of economic credentialing is
often found to be financially legitimate and legally permissible in a
competitive market as long as hospitals comply with the laws on safety
and competition. Hospitals are business entities that can seek to max-
imize their profits. Much has been written on whether economic cre-
dentialing is anti-competitive.' Assuming that it is not so in all cir-
cumstances, which seems to be a conclusion often employed by
courts,"2 and assuming that hospitals are not compromising the safety
36. Rice, supra note 26.
37. Rice, supra note 26.
38. Cathey obtained an injunction against Baptist and settled shortly thereafter.
Cathey v. Baptist, No. CV-2005-5701 (Cir. Ct. Ark. Apr. 18, 2005).
39. Baptist Health v. Murphy, 362 Ark. 506, 511,209 S.W.3d 360, 364 (2005).
40. Baptist Health v. Murphy, 365 Ark. 115, 132,226 S.W.3d 800, 813 (2006).
41. See Anne S. Kimbol, The Debate Over Specialty Hospitals: How Physician-
Hospital Relationships Have Reached a New Fault Line Over These "Focused Facto-
ries," 38 J. HEALTH L. 633 (2005) (arguing that specialty hospitals are helpful entities
and that there should be limits on economic credentialing); Tracy A. Powell, The
Permissibility of Conflicts Credentialing (A/K/A Economic Credentialing) by Tradi-
tional Hospitals as a Response to the Growth of Specialty Hospitals, 20 No. 1 HEALTH
LAWYER 17 (2007) (concluding that laws governing economic credentialing are not
settled but that economic credentialing may be legal in some cases); Weeks, supra
note 15 (concluding that many of the new forms of economic credentialing violate
state and federal antitrust statutes). See generally William E. Berlin, Antitrust Implica-
tions Between Physician-Owned Facilities and General Hospitals: Competition or Exclu-
sion, 20 No. 5 HEALTH LAWYER 1 (2008) (detailing recent developments in case law,
antitrust legislation, and potential defenses to litigation against economic credential-
ing); Beverly Cohen, An Examination of the Right of Hospitals to Engage in Economic
Credentialing, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 705 (2004) (surveying case law, state law, and federal
law and concluding that there are few instances in which economic credentialing is
foreclosed).
42. See, e.g. Mahan, 621 N.W.2d at 160 (citing Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n,
Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1390, 1401 (DMd 1993); Hutton v. Memorial Hosp., 824 P.2d 61, 63
(ColoApp 1991); Sarin v. Samaritan Health Center, 176 Mich. App. 790, 440 N.W.2d 80,
82 (MichApp 1989); Lewin v. St. Joseph Hosp., 82 Cal. App. 3d 368, 146 Cal. Rptr. 892,
906-07 (CalCtApp 1978).,
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of their patients-which is best left open for another discussion-
hospitals will continue to employ this tool. Businesses will usually not
hire employees who are at the same time actively competing with
them, and GSHs have successfully argued that the same should be true
for hospitals. 3 GSHs have relied upon these laissez-faire arguments to
support their economic-credentialing policies. '
The difficulty is that GSHs also employ wholly non-competitive
arguments in opposing specialty hospitals. As discussed previously,
GSHs critique specialty hospitals arguing that (1) the specialty hospit-
als threaten the viability of GSHs by skimming off revenue-generating
cases that finance unprofitable basic services and (2) the specialty
hospitals create conflicts of interest when physicians refer patients to
their own hospitals for financial reasons.45 Neither of these arguments
seeks to allow the marketplace to solve their concerns-the supposed
rationale for allowing economic-credentialing policies. The first ar-
gument supports subsidizing unprofitable areas within the hospital
through reduced consumer choice-a definitely non-market-based
concern. The second basis is an ethical concern that, by implication,
seeks to impose non-market-based (i.e., ethical) restrictions on the
actions of doctors with financial stakes in specialty hospitals.
Even with economic-credentialing policies, GSHs success in
thwarting the growth of specialty hospitals through competition will
be impossible. As long as GSHs maintain unprofitable centers, they
will lose out against specialty hospitals on a strictly competitive basis.
As a consequence, GSHs have resorted to governmental intervention
by actively lobbying Congress to extend a ban on the creation of new
specialty hospitals.46 There is no doubt that society needs both the
profitable and currently unprofitable groups within GSHs. The ques-
tion is how to ensure GSHs continued viability. GSHs attempt to do
so by running specialty hospitals out of business through competitive
and non-competitive devices. The cost of such a proposal is that the
generally better care provided at specialty hospitals-for the areas
that they cover-will be lost in an effort to subsidize the unprofitable
centers at GSHs. That seems wrong.
43. Cohen, supra note 10, at 729 (citing Rosenblum v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'I
Med. Ctr., No. 91-589, slip. op. at 3 (Cir. Ct. Fla. June 18, 1992)).
44. See, e.g., Mahan, 621 N.W.2d at 156.
45. AAMC Reporter, supra note 1; see supra note 7.
46. Iglehart, Hospitals, supra note 3, at 83.
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III. CONCLUSION
We should not saddle the owners of specialty hospitals with the
responsibility of ensuring that both the profitable and currently unpro-
fitable groups within GSHs survive-particularly as a mere coinci-
dence of the fact they compete with GSHs. The alternatives are to
develop a means to make the unprofitable centers profitable and/or to
supplement the unprofitable but medically-necessary functions of
GSHs. If we choose government intervention to prop up GSHs, socie-
ty is better served by providing for subsidization rather than squel-
ching healthy competition.
Moreover, as long as GSHs seek extra-competitive, governmental
resolution to their concerns, they are profoundly subject to an equal
attack. Supporters of specialty hospitals might well suggest that go-
vernmental entities and/or private regulating bodies such as the AMA
regulate GSHs use of economic credentialing.
Such logic would not be without basis. For example, the AMA
"adopted an opinion of the Judicial Council that declared that non-
competition agreements were not 'in the public interest."'47 The AMA
Council on Ethical and Medical Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics
states:
9.02 Restrictive Covenants and the Practice of Medicine: Cove-
nants not to compete restrict competition, disrupt continuity of
care, and potentially deprive the public of medical services. The
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs discourages any agreement
which restricts the right of a physician to practice medicine for a
specified period of time or in a specified area upon termination of
an employment, partnership or corporate agreement. Restrictive
covenants are unethical if they are excessive in geographic scope or
duration in the circumstances presented, or if they fail to make rea-
sonable accommodation of patients' choice of physician.
8
Even had, as discussed above, the AMA not explicitly opposed
the use of economic credentialing, the logic of Section 9.02 would
equally speak to the AMA's disapproval of economic credentialing.
Thus, before GSHs seek to continue to attack specialty hospitals with
their new-found interest in unchecked business practices, they should
47. Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants not to Compete between Physi-
cians: Protecting Doctors' Interests at Patients' Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 9
(1992).
48. Available at http://www.heart-intl.net/HEART/030106/AMAcode.htm.
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keep in mind that they may die by the very sword they have previously
employed-non-market regulatory forces.

